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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DIVERSE NATURE OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

STEVEN F. FRIEDELL*
The issue is whether the grant of admiralty jurisdiction gives federal courts
a power to make law. The law at present is that federal courts generally have
the power to make admiralty law except in those areas where states have a
strong interest. 1 It is sometimes said that state law will also be applied where
federal law has been silent. 2 This differs from the diversity case in two
respects: state law has a limited role to play and state courts are bound by
admiralty law. These two aspects of admiralty jurisdiction are known as the
“reverse-Erie” principle.
We know very little about the intentions of the Constitution’s drafters
when it comes to this issue. One could imagine a universe where federal
courts would apply one set of substantive rules in admiralty cases, but leave
states free to apply another. One could also imagine a world where federal
courts would leave the law making power in admiralty cases to the states. I
think the first possibility, which was the structure in the nineteenth century, 3 is
undesirable. 4 To that extent I agree that the teaching of Erie v. Tompkins 5 is
right. Both the Erie and the reverse-Erie doctrines aim at achieving uniformity
between federal and state courts. The second possibility, which would treat
admiralty cases no differently from any diversity cases, would be manageable
if Congress were given the power to protect the federal interests. Given the
active role that federal courts have played in fashioning admiralty law,
however, I think it is simply too late to turn this power over to the states.
Moreover, Congress has affirmed the power of federal courts to make
admiralty law. The Admiralty Extension Act 6 is premised on the notion that
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden).
1. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 n. 2 (1986), citing
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739, 81 S.Ct. 886, 892, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961).
2. E.g., Palestina v. Fernandez, 701 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1983).
3. See Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 14 S. Ct. 264 (1893); Steamboat Company v. Chase,
83 (16 Wall.) U.S. 522 (1872); Kalleck v. Deering, 161 Mass. 469, 37 N.E. 450 (1894).
4. For a contrary view, see David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal
Maritime Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325 (1995).
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1948), which provides in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include
all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable
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substantive admiralty law, not the law of the various states, will be applied to
cases within the admiralty jurisdiction. 7 Moreover, the large role that federal
courts play in fashioning admiralty law has become a fixture in the planning of
federal and state law-making bodies. When Congress enacted the Harter Act, 8
the Salvage Act9 and COGSA, 10 it did so with the assumption that it was
amending admiralty law made and interpreted largely by federal courts. As
the Supreme Court was fond of saying, “Congress has largely left to this Court
the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.” 11
Congress has shared that view and has embedded it in admiralty law by
enacting several statutes in this area.
If we were to debate the issue in terms of first principles we might phrase
it in the following terms: what makes an admiralty case different from a
diversity case? Should Erie’s teaching and the revolution that it created be
extended to admiralty cases?
Theoretically one could answer that Erie was wrong and that Jensen’s
teaching 12 should be applied to diversity cases. I do not want to make that
argument. It would destroy our concept of federalism for state courts to be
generally bound by federal courts’ determinations of law. But why, then, are
state courts bound by the federal courts’ determination of admiralty law?

water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
In any such case suit may be brought in rem or in personam according to the principles of
law and the rules of practice obtaining in cases where the injury or damage has been done
and consummated on navigable water.
For a discussion, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Admiralty Extension Act at Fifty, 29 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 495 (1998).
7. Congress understood that expanding admiralty jurisdiction would have the effect of
displacing state law. The Senate report noted:
As a result of the denial of admiralty jurisdiction in cases where injury is done on land,
when a vessel collides with a bridge through mutual fault and both are damaged, under
existing law the owner of the bridge, being denied a remedy in admiralty, is barred by
contributory negligence from any recovery in an action at law. But the owner of the
vessel may by a suit in admiralty recover half damages from the bridge, contributory
negligence operating merely to reduce the recovery. . . . The bill under consideration
would correct these inequities.
See S. Rep. 80-1593 at 2 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898.
8. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196 (1893).
9. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 727, 729-731 (1912).
10. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315(1936).
11. Fitzgerald v United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963), quoted in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 96 (1980); United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975); Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet 414 U.S. 573, 588 (1974);
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 n. 17 (1970).
12. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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One could say that admiralty is an exception to Erie. Erie did not
eradicate the federal common law, and admiralty is a part of that law. 13
Admiralty jurisdiction is different from anything else. Unlike diversity cases,
the grant of admiralty jurisdiction is the only grant in Article III that is based
not on the status of the parties but on the subject matter of the dispute. It is at
least conceivable that the drafters thought that this subject matter—admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction—possessed its own set of rules that ought to be
applied. 14 Salvage cases, undoubtedly part of the admiralty jurisdiction from
the beginning, are governed by admiralty law. Where else were courts to look?
There was no state law of salvage. The same can be said of general average,
unseaworthiness or maintenance and cure. It strains credulity to assume that
the drafters meant for salvage cases to be decided by common law so that no
salvor would have recovery.
I would not want to make too much of this argument. It is doubtful that the
drafters intended the federal courts having admiralty jurisdiction to apply
admiralty substantive law to areas like bills of lading, charter parties, contracts
to repair ships and the like. In England, there was no admiralty law governing
these substantive areas. These areas were governed by common law. In
addition, cargo cases were not part of the jurisdiction of England’s High Court
of Admiralty. They were tried in the common law courts according to
common law.
One could argue that the drafters did not limit their frame of reference to
the English practice but also had in mind the European nations that recognized
a set of rules governing maritime contracts. That was part of Justice Story’s
theory, 15 and it might have been part of what the framers had in mind. The
framers may not have conceived of the problem in the way we do. That is,
rather than thinking of the source of the law in, say, a bill of lading case, as
being common law as opposed to admiralty law, or the law of New York as
opposed to the law of the United States, the drafters may have simply thought
that law was law. They may have thought that all judges, regardless of their
title, were charged with doing the same thing: trying to determine the law
governing a case. We debunk natural law as a fiction. But what if the drafters
believed in natural law? They might well have expected a federal judge sitting
in admiralty to consult all relevant decisions and statutes, foreign as well as
domestic, and determine as best he could what those sources revealed the true
rule of law to be.

13. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 201 (1996).
14. See also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 386 (1970) (“[m]aritime
law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing apart from the common law. It was,
to a large extent, administered by different courts; it owed a much greater debt to the civil
law. . .”).
15. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
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This of course proves too much. It would justify not only the federal
courts’ power to make admiralty law, but it would require that state courts be
free to make their own law in admiralty cases that they tried. If Erie does
anything, it destroys the natural law conception. It forces us to say whether a
rule of law is federal or state law, and it prohibits the application of different
substantive rules in state and federal court. The Jensen doctrine actually
foreshadowed Erie in this important respect.
Another way of phrasing the objection to federal courts’ law-making
authority in admiralty is the teaching of Erie that federal courts lack the power
to make law generally because Congress lacks the power to do so. Since the
Constitution gives limited law making authority to Congress, it would violate
the Constitution for courts to exercise a general law making role. Although
this is a valid concern with respect to the common law, it is not a bar to the
exercise of judicial law-making authority in admiralty cases. Congressional
power over admiralty law is much different. Congress has the power, not only
under the Commerce 16 and Necessary and Proper Clauses, 17 but under the
grant of Admiralty Jurisdiction in Article III to amend admiralty law made by
the courts. 18 Still, it does seem inconsistent with Erie to give Congress and the
courts a general law making authority in admiralty matters that they lack in
diversity cases. Even though there is a federal interest that is sufficient to
justify federal law making in admiralty, the same can be said of much of the
diversity docket. The answer, I think, is to be found in our history that
recognized a large role for the federal courts and for Congress to play in
shipping matters. The issue here is not being considered in a vacuum. It is
being played out against a record of substantial federal involvement going to
the heart of maritime commerce in this country.
Either we allow state and federal courts to apply different substantive rules
or we do not. If we require uniformity between state and federal courts, then it
is too late to divest federal courts of their law-making power in admiralty.
Neither can we deprive the states of their power to make law generally, nor
should we deprive states of that power when important state interests are
implicated in an admiralty case. The states and the federal government each
have important roles to play in the development of admiralty law. There will
be fierce arguments at the margins, and there will be disagreement over how to
express the test or tests for allocating power, but it is too late for either the
federal or state governments to have exclusive power in this field. I do not
think this issue can be resolved as a matter of logic. Nor do I think that a
single verbal formula will adequately address the myriad of issues that can

16. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City Of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 274 (1972).
17. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra note 12, at 214-15.
18. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959).
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arise. Luckily the drafters have left the matter sufficiently open that a variety
of approaches can be tried.
Although I generally favor flexibility over a rigid, doctrinaire approach, I
recognize that sometimes there can be too much flexibility which results in
confusion. This has happened in the wrongful death area. Jensen recognized
that states might apply their wrongful death statutes even when death occurred
on the navigable waters, and the Supreme Court later applied state wrongful
death law even when a case was brought within the admiralty jurisdiction. 19
This led to all sorts of confusion as the Supreme Court was sharply divided
over how to apply state wrongful death law when the state did not recognize a
maritime tort like unseaworthiness. 20 In Moragne, 21 decided in 1970, the
Supreme Court overturned that part of Jensen by creating a new wrongful
death remedy. For a time, this seemed to clear up most of the confusion. In
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 22 all of the justices recognized that if federal
courts had jurisdiction over pleasure boating accidents causing injury or death,
federal rules would displace state law. Ignoring that view, a unanimous
Supreme Court recently held in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun 23 that state
wrongful death law may supplement the remedy created in Moragne. Not to
be undone, the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply Yamaha to a case of wrongful
death caused by a vessel in navigation, 24 citing Jensen as support. The irony
is that the Jensen court approved of the use of state wrongful death laws.
The wrongful death cases are not pretty to look at. I do not, however,
think they are typical, and I think courts will eventually sort them out. For the
most part, courts, lawyers and those regularly engaged in shipping have a fairly
clear idea about the source of law to be applied to their case, and state
legislatures have the ability to regulate much of maritime commerce where
state interests are seriously affected.
That is what we have at the moment. The law in this area is a mess. It is,
however, our mess, and it serves a purpose. It allows federal and state interests
to be given effect and it recognizes that no single verbal formula can
adequately resolve the complex issues that arise in a variety of contexts. It also
leaves the courts some room to adjust the admiralty law to the shifting
approaches to the proper allocation of authority between state and federal
governments in a federal system.

19. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
20. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314
(1960).
21. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
22. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
23. 516 U.S. 199, 201 (1996).
24. In re Amtrack “Sunset Limited” Train Crash In Bayou Canot, 121 F.3d 1421, 1997
AMC 2962 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1041 (1998).
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